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Abstract
Background: The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a common paradigm used to study the interactions
between emotions and decision making, yet little consensus exists on the cognitive process
determining participants' decisions, what affects them, and how these processes interact with each
other. A novel conceptual framework is proposed according to which behavior in the IGT reflects
a balance between two dissociable processes; a cognitively demanding process that tracks each
option's long-term payoff, and a lower-level, automatic process that is primarily sensitive to loss
frequency and magnitude.
Methods: A behavioral experiment was carried out with a modified version of IGT. In this
modified version, participants went through an additional phase of interaction, designed to measure
performance without further learning, in which no feedback on individual decisions was given. A
secondary distractor task was presented in either the first or the second phase of the experiment.
Behavioral measures of performance tracking both payoff and frequency sensitivity in choices were
collected throughout the experiment.
Results: Consistent with our framework, the results confirmed that: (a) the two competing
cognitive processes can be dissociated; (b) that learning from decision outcomes requires central
cognitive resources to estimate long-term payoff; and (c) that the decision phase itself can be
carried out during an interfering task once learning has occurred.
Conclusion: The experimental results support our novel description of the cognitive processes
underlying performance in the Iowa Gambling Task. They also suggest that patients' impairments
in this and other gambling paradigms can originate from a number of different causes, including a
failure in allocating resources among cognitive strategies. This latter interpretation might be
particularly useful in explaining the impairments of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex
lesions and, by extension, the contribution of this brain region to human decision making.
Background
Gambling paradigms are widely used to investigate the
relationships between emotions and decision making in
behavioral [1,2], neuropsychological [3-5], and neuroim-
aging studies [6-10]. The most frequently used gambling
paradigm, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), was originally
designed to measure the impulsive conduct of patients
with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) lesions [3].
Published: 2 January 2009
Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:1 doi:10.1186/1744-9081-5-1
Received: 13 September 2008
Accepted: 2 January 2009
This article is available from: http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/1
© 2009 Stocco et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:1 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/1
Page 2 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
In the IGT, participants repeatedly select a card from the
top of four decks, indicated as A, B, C, and D. Each selec-
tion returns an immediate win, with the amount depend-
ent on the chosen deck. At times, however, an unexpected
loss may follow the win. Losses are unpredictable, but
they are scheduled so that choosing from the decks which
return high immediate winnings (A  and  B: the "bad
decks") leads to an eventual failure, while choosing from
those associated with humbler gains (C and D: the "good
decks") produces proportionately minor losses, yielding a
gain in the long run.
While normal participants quickly learned to refrain from
the bad decks, VMPFC patients perseverated on from
selecting them, apparently oblivious of the future conse-
quences [3,11,12]. Poor performances in the IGT were
later reported in patients with damage in other brain
regions, for example the amygdala [13], the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) [14,15], and the striatum
[16,17]. The IGT has proven to be sensible to a large
number of impairments and a large number of psychiatric
populations score significantly lower than controls, prob-
ably because they share the same decision making impair-
ments. These include patients with schizophrenia [18-21],
obsessive-compulsive disorder [22,23], depression
[24,25], and alcohol or drug abuse [26-28].
Controversies surrounding the IGT
Results from the IGT have provided the basis for a general
theory of the relationship between cognition and emo-
tion, i.e., the Somatic Marker Hypothesis [29,30]. How-
ever, although instrumental in describing the patients'
behavioral impairments, this task has an unstructured
nature that poses limitations in characterizing the cogni-
tive processes underlying it [31]. This lack of agreement
has lead to a number of disputes in the literature.
Theories have differed, for example, on their proposed role
of the VMPFC in decision making. According to some
researchers, the VMPFC is primarily involved in binding
somatic states with the actions that initially caused them.
VMPFC damage prevents this binding, as well as the antici-
patory alerting signal that comes from expecting the stored
somatic states before repeating the same action [29,30,32].
Other authors have argued, however, that the VMPFC is
needed to revert previously learned associations, in particu-
lar following negative feedback [33,34]. Still others have
claimed that the VMPFC biases decision making by facilitat-
ing the emotional experience of regret [5,6].
Researchers also divide on whether unconscious emo-
tional processes underlie successful decision making in
the IGT. One landmark study [11] found that skin con-
ductance responses, which characteristically foretell selec-
tions from bad decks [35], appeared before participants
were able to explicitly verbalize their decision strategies.
Participants' awareness, however, was only assessed with
open-ended, verbal questions, a method that lacks suffi-
cient sensitivity to detect all the relevant task knowledge
(e.g., [36]). When a more structured, written question-
naire was adopted [37], or when participants were simply
asked to rate each deck's goodness [18,38], the results sug-
gested participants knew more about the task than previ-
ously believed. Furthermore, this knowledge was
correlated with successful performance of the task [37].
Still, the presence of explicit knowledge does not necessar-
ily rule out implicit components. When participants'
knowledge is assessed by means of indirect, behavioral
techniques, they do exhibit evidence that their decisions
are at least partly driven by unconscious decision biases
[39]. In summary, participants' explicit knowledge was
initially underestimated, and is likely to be the main force
driving their behavior. However, processes that are auto-
matic and implicit in nature do exert subtle influences in
orienting decisions, and their effects can be traced in form
of decision biases.
A third, important debate concerns whether emotional
decision making can be carried out independently of gen-
eral cognitive resources, and, in particular, of working
memory. For example, one study [40] contrasted the per-
formance of VMPFC patients against patients with DLPFC
lesions. All patients performed the IGT and two working
memory tasks. The results indicated a double dissociation,
with VMPFC patients impaired in the IGT but not in the
two working memory tasks, and DLPFC patients showing
the opposite pattern. Subsequent research, however,
failed to replicate these findings. Two studies reported
that DLPFC damage negatively affects IGT performance
[14,15], and one found a correlation between working
memory impairment and low performance on the IGT in
individuals with substance dependence [41]. Experiments
with healthy controls also produced contrasting results.
Turnbull and colleagues [42] compared the performance
of three groups of participants in the IGT. The first group
served as a control. The second performed the IGT
together with a concurrent, shallow task that did not tap
into central cognitive resources (i.e., verbally repeating the
sequence of numbers 1 to 9). The last group performed a
concurrent task that is known to load working memory
and central resources (i.e., generating random numbers).
Surprisingly, performance was comparable across all three
groups, suggesting that successful decision making in the
IGT depends on rather automatic processes that do not
rely on central resources. A number of other experiments,
however, adopted similar design and found different
results. In particular, they reported that IGT performance
was consistently lower when the interfering task was
demanding for working memory than when it was not
[43-46].Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:1 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/1
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Without a clear understanding of the cognitive processes
recruited by the IGT, it is difficult to make sense of these
results. It is entirely possible, for instance, that working
memory resources are needed only at certain moments
during the task. For instance, participants might simply
stick with their initially preferred decks until losses
become noticeable. Then, they might pause and start to
reason about each decks' outcomes to reconsider their
profitability. When done with this assessment, they can
simply proceed with their new preferred options for
another while. This possibility is explicitly incorporated in
the framework presented in this paper. Importantly, this
possibility makes it difficult to evaluate a secondary task's
effectiveness, if the task is self-paced and its performance
is not checked (as in [42]). An ideal interfering task, there-
fore, should exert its cognitive toll consistently through-
out the IGT. In fact, any manipulation that consistently
prevents participants from devoting time and cognitive
resources for an accurate deck assessment should nega-
tively impact decisions making. A recent paper [47] seems
to confirm this intuition. In this study, the authors found
that IGT performance was impaired when participants
had to select a card within two seconds. Such a severe time
constraint might have served the purpose of reducing the
time necessary to adequately evaluate the decks, even in
absence of any interfering task.
Additional limitations of the IGT
For the purposes of this paper, two additional limitations
are worth mentioning. The first is that performance in the
IGT has been traditionally analyzed in terms of long-term
payoff. This fact betrays the assumption that emotional
decision making obeys the classical economic theory in
which the decision maker maximizes the expected values
of options. In contrast with this assumption, some studies
have reported a singularity in the distribution of choices:
deck B (one of the two disadvantageous decks) is usually
chosen more frequently than each of the two advanta-
geous decks taken separately [48,49]. Other studies also
consistently show that participants are sensitive to the fre-
quency of losses, and that, when payoff is kept equal, they
tend to select from those decks where losses are less fre-
quent [45,50-52].
In fact, experimental evidence suggests that losses influ-
ence human decision making more than the simple pay-
off. Participants typically reject gambles that offer equal
probabilities of gaining and losing money [53,54], and
they value an object they have to part from more than they
would pay for it [55-57]. Moreover, prospect theory [58],
the most influential behavioral model of human decision
making, explicitly assumes a value function where losses
are perceived as greater than gains of equal amount.
There is also evidence that the effect of monetary losses is
modulated by their frequency and temporal proximity. For
example, participants are more likely to reject a risky gam-
ble if their previous bet resulted in a loss than if it resulted
in win, even if the two gambles are totally independent [2].
In the brain, neuroimaging studies have shown that
reward-related activation in the prefrontal cortices is tem-
porally discounted, so that rewards or losses distant in time
elicit weaker responses than closer ones [59]. A temporal
discount enhances the sensitivity to frequency, since
smaller but closer losses weigh more than larger, remote
ones. In computational models of reinforcement learning,
loss frequency affects action selection [60]. These types of
algorithms constitute reliable models of the basic reinforce-
ment signals in the brain [61] and have been used to model
participants' choices in the IGT [62].
A second, noteworthy limitation derives from the iterative
nature of the IGT. In this task, participants are continu-
ously interleaving two kinds of cognitive operations:
learning about the task structure from the cards' feedback,
and using this information to decide which deck to select
from. Traditionally, patients' abnormal behavior has been
imputed to the decision component [3,12]. It is equally
possible, however, that patients' impairment originates
from an impasse in the learning stage, or a combination
of the two. An experiment by Fellows and Farah [33] pro-
vides evidence in this sense. The authors tested a group of
VMPFC patients with a modified version of the IGT, where
deck losses were presented immediately, in the very first
few choices. When patients had the opportunity to evalu-
ate losses upfront, their performance reverted to normal.
This finding suggests that their specific disablement was
due more to relearning the correct associations between
deck and payoff after they were initially established than
to faulty decision making. It is clear, therefore, that inter-
pretation of patients' failures within the IGT crucially
depends on the distinction between learning and the deci-
sion stages. At the best of our knowledge, this distinction
has been overlooked in the literature thus far.
To summarize, the IGT is a popular and valuable research
paradigm that taps into the interaction between emotion
and cognition. However, a deeper understanding of the
cognitive processes underlying decisions in the task is
needed to make sense of a number of issues. These
include: (a) the role of implicit decision biases, possibly
of affective nature; (b) the role of working memory in
assessing each deck's value; (c) participants' biases
towards low-frequency losses; and (d) the interplay
between learning from decision outcomes and applying
this acquired knowledge to the decision process.
An integrative framework
In order to investigate the possible processes underlying
participants' behavior in the IGT, one needs a preliminary
characterization of how these processes outlined above
contribute to decision making, what affects them, andBehavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:1 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/1
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how they interact. In this paper, we outline and test a sim-
ple organizing framework based on three assumptions.
The first assumption is that participants' behavior is
driven by at least two competing forces; the tendency to
choose a deck based on its perceived ultimate payoff and
the tendency to select a deck based on previous emotional
reactions to experienced wins and losses. This second ten-
dency can be affected by a number of different factors. The
most obvious one is the perceived frequency of losses and
wins among decks. While other factors might play a role
(e.g., the outcome magnitude, although in previous exper-
iments [50] we found that this feature did not play a
causal role in determining the participant's choices), we
will consider the frequency of losses and wins as the pri-
mary force driving decision making based on emotions.
The second assumption is that the cognitive processes
mediating these tendencies are independent, and poten-
tially underpinned by different brain circuits. This
assumption originates from the fact that detecting long-
term payoff requires higher-level cognitive abilities and
working memory to keep track of wins and losses. It also
implies that payoff estimation is by nature a more difficult
task. Therefore, this process is more likely to fail and select
the wrong decks – especially when cognitive resources are
depleted, or deck payoffs are made harder to discriminate.
Emotional reactions to decision outcomes, on the other
hand, are widely regarded as an automatic and less
demanding process.
The third assumption is that behavior is guided by the rep-
resentations produced by these two processes while learn-
ing from the decision outcomes. For instance, participants
might construct and revise the estimates for the mean gain
of a deck while evaluating the long-term payoff of an
option, and concurrently form somatic memories of their
emotional reactions when a win or a loss is unveiled.
These two types of representations differ in richness, artic-
ulation, and easiness of access with payoff-sensitive repre-
sentations being more explicit and difficult to create, and
emotional memories being closer to intuition-mediated
processes in decision making. One important conse-
quence of this assumption is that, if learning is suddenly
interrupted, participants can still base their decisions on
representations they have previously acquired through
either process.
Experimental predictions
Although simple and qualitative, this framework allows a
number of hitherto untested predictions. The first,
straightforward prediction is that participants' preferences
(in terms of payoffs or loss frequency) must be learned
during the IGT. That is, under normal conditions of itera-
tive, repeated choice preferences for loss frequency and
payoff will change over time and exhibit learning curves as
information is progressively gained about each deck's
wins and losses.
The second prediction is that the presence of a secondary
task should affect only participants' sensitivity to the
decks' payoffs, and not their preferences in terms of fre-
quency. This follows from our second assumption that the
process underlying sensitivity to payoff, but not loss fre-
quency, is cognitively demanding and requires central
resources.
The third prediction is that a secondary task should affect
only the learning phase, while it should not alter partici-
pants' decision behavior after learning has occurred. This
follows from the third assumption that, once learning has
occurred, knowledge remains accessible and can be
quickly used for deciding, even in spite of an interfering
task.
The fourth prediction is that monetary losses should have
little or no impact on participants' preferences in terms of
payoffs, but should nonetheless elicit emotional reactions
that bias preferences in terms of frequency. Emotional
reactions are likely to depend upon the magnitude of the
loss, with larger losses resulting in stronger aversive reac-
tions. Because of the internal constraints of the tasks, the
two decks that deliver losses less frequently (B and D) also
yield larger-magnitude losses than their similar-payoff
counterpart (i.e., A and C, respectively). Therefore, they
are more likely to be avoided immediately after experienc-
ing an unfavorable result. This implies that choices based
on loss frequency should be more likely after a positive
than a negative outcome.
The third and the fourth predictions imply a double dis-
sociation between payoff- and frequency-tracking proc-
esses. If the two were completely independent, there
would be no interaction between the presence of mone-
tary loss and the presence of an interfering task. However,
the distribution of choices based on loss frequency infor-
mation is likely to change when information on payoff is
available. Since the acquisition of payoff information is
hindered by an interfering task, a fifth prediction can be
derived, stating that the presence of a secondary task
should interact with the experience of a previous mone-
tary loss in terms of frequency, but not in terms of payoff.
Methods
To test these predictions, one needs to identify behavioral
correlates of the two processes outlined above (the high-
level one that orients towards payoffs and the lower-level
one that tracks loss frequency). Fortunately, in most ver-
sions of the IGT, payoff and loss frequency are independ-
ently manipulated among decks. Two decks (A and B)Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:1 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/1
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have negative payoff, while in the remaining two (C and
D) the payoff is ultimately positive. Of each pair, one deck
(A and C) has a high frequency of losses (5 losses out of
every 10 trials), while in the other (B and D, respectively)
losses appear with low frequency (1 loss out of every 10
trials). Therefore, behavioral preferences in terms of pay-
off and frequency can be tracked by grouping participants'
choices according to these two criteria. We will refer to
these two measures of performance as the P (for payoff)
and the Q (for frequency) indexes.
A second requirement is to have some means of separat-
ing the learning and the decision phases. Stocco and Fum
[39] solved this problem by having participants perform
an additional "blind" phase after a standard initial learn-
ing phase with the IGT. During this phase, participants
were invited to continue selecting as previously, but wins
and losses were kept secret, and the net amount of money
won was only revealed at the end. Since learning cannot
occur in this phase, behavior depends entirely on the deci-
sion component, and a comparison with the previous
phase permits an estimation of the learning component.
The experiment presented in this paper intentionally
exploits this manipulation to test the framework's predic-
tions. In the experiment, participants initially performed
a standard, 100-choice interaction with the IGT. When
this phase was completed, they performed a second, 20-
choice blind phase, allowing us to measure decision per-
formance uncontaminated by further learning.
A secondary, distractor task was introduced during either
the initial learning phase or during the additional blind
phase to estimate the contribution of central cognitive
resources when learning is involved (first phase) or not
(second phase). Therefore, three factors were manipu-
lated: the Phase (first vs. second, within subjects), the
Condition in the first phase (Dual task vs. IGT only,
between subjects) and the Condition in the second phase
(Dual vs. IGT, between subjects). During both phases,
participants' performance was assessed both in terms of
payoff and loss frequency.
Participants
One-hundred fifty-two unpaid volunteers (mean age
22.2, SD = 2.9, 81 females) were recruited at the Univer-
sity of Trieste, Italy. Since age [64] and education [65]
seem to affect IGT performance, participants were
included only if their age fell inside the range of 18–34
years (corresponding to the young adults group in [64])
and were enrolled in a first-level college degree ("Laurea
Triennale", corresponding to 13–15 years of education).
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four
groups (Dual/Dual, Dual/IGT, IGT/IGT, and IGT/Dual).
Paired comparisons ensured that the four groups did not
differ from each other on either age (p > .05, Wilcoxon
test, uncorrected) or gender distribution (p > .30, χ2 test,
uncorrected).
The interfering task
The interfering task was designed to be fast-paced and
consistently cognitive demanding. Participants were audi-
torally presented with a series of numbers in the range 1–
10. For each number, they had to indicate whether it was
even or odd by pressing one of two buttons on a numeric
keypad. To make sure the secondary task did not interfere
with the main task at the irrelevant level of perceptual/
motor abilities, numbers were presented auditorally and
the answer was given with the non-dominant hand. The
lag between the onsets of two consecutive stimuli was
fixed to two or three seconds. Stimuli were presented in
random order, with the only constraint that the same
stimulus could not occur twice in a row.
Procedure
Experimental sessions were held individually. Participants
received written instructions, which were an Italian trans-
lation of those in [12]. After reading the instructions, they
completed the first phase of a computer version of the
IGT. The software used was a custom-made replica of the
program originally used in [12]. Decks were visually pre-
sented in the lower part of a 15 in. LCD screen, and par-
ticipants used a mouse device to point and select the deck
they had chosen. Immediately after each card selection,
the amount of money won (and possibly lost) was dis-
played in the center of the upper half of the screen. The
presentation of wins and losses lasted 6 s, during which
the decks were grayed out and no card could be selected.
The running total of money was always visible in the
uppermost part of the screen and was updated after each
selection.
Before the second phase, the experimenter gave new writ-
ten instructions to participants and ascertained their com-
prehension. These new instructions emphasized that
decks' profitableness was unchanged, and participants
could continue selecting as they did before. No wins or
losses were presented after any card selection during this
phase, but the decks were still grayed out for the same
amount of time to keep the interaction consistent with the
previous phase. The IGT was performed in the A'B'C'D'
version [12]. This version was chosen because, in our pre-
vious experiments and pilot studies, it had produced an
evener distribution of choices between the two low-fre-
quency decks (B and D).
In the secondary task, stimuli were presented through a
pair of wireless earphones, and participants responded by
pressing one of two keys on a numeric pad. Participants
were instructed to use their non-dominant hand to pressBehavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:1 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/1
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the two keys, leaving their dominant hand free to use the
mouse for the main task. This way, the motor interference
between the two tasks was minimized. Additionally, all
the participants underwent a brief training session with
the secondary task procedure before the beginning of the
experimental session where it was adopted.
Data analysis
The most common performance measure in the IGT is the
difference between the number of good (C and D) and
bad (A and B) decks selected in a series of consecutive
choices. This is a measure of payoff, and, for convenience,
we adopted it as a proxy for P:
P = (C + D) - (A + B)
To obtain a comparable measure for participants' sensitiv-
ity to frequency, Q was similarly calculated as the differ-
ence between the number of choices from the low- (B and
D) and the high- (A and C) loss-frequency decks:
Q = (B + D) - (A + C)
Results and discussion
To assess compliance with the instructions and the effec-
tiveness of our design, we excluded those participants
who, in the secondary task, responded to less than 60% of
the stimuli (in the 3 s condition), or 40% (in the 2 s con-
dition) in either phase. Three participants fell below this
criterion, and their data were therefore removed from all
subsequent analyses.
A preliminary series of tests was then run on the secondary
task data. Table 1 reports the mean accuracy rates for both
phases under the two lag conditions. Accuracy was ana-
lyzed separately for the two phases, using a mixed-effects
ANOVA with Lag (2 s vs. 3 s) and Group (Dual/Dual vs.
Dual/IGT for Phase 1, and Dual/Dual vs. IGT/Dual for
Phase 2) as factors. In these as well as in all the following
analyses, subjects were the random factor. Accuracy rates
were arcsine-root transformed before being submitted to
the analysis. In both phases, only the Lag factor was signif-
icant [Phase 1: F(1, 74) = 60.82, p < .0001; Phase 2: F(1,
73) = 6.64, p = .01; all other factors or interactions: F <
1.62]. In particular, participants responded less accurately
in the 2 s then in the 3 s condition (see Table 1).
A second series of analyses was conducted to uncover any
effect of Lag factor on IGT performance. Separate ANOVAs
were conducted for the two phases, using Lag and Group
as factors, and either P or Q as the dependent measures.
The Lag had a significant effect only on the Q index in the
second phase [F(1, 73) = 4.78, p = .03], with participants
drawing more often from the low-frequency decks in the
2 s (Q = 13.46, SD = 5.98) than in the 3 s condition (Q =
10.86, SD = 4.38). This effect could be due to the lack of
feedback in this phase; unaware of their performance, the
increased pressure of the task could have pushed partici-
pants to rely more than usual on the shallow, emotion-
driven decision process. All the other factors or interac-
tions were non-significant (F < 3.15). Because the Lag fac-
tor did not have important effects on IGT performance,
and in order to increase statistical power, data were col-
lapsed across Lag conditions in all the remaining analysis.
In order to test our experimental predictions, the values of
P and Q were calculated for each participant for each con-
secutive block of 20 choices in the first phase. Analyses of
variance were then performed on P  and  Q  separately,
using the Block (5 values, 01–20 to 81–100), the Condi-
tion in the first phase (2 values, Dual vs. IGT), and the
Condition in the second phase (2 values, Dual vs. IGT)
and as factors. The latter was included to make sure that
the experimental groups did not differ already in the first
phase, while the Block factor was included to capture the
learning curve.
The left panels in Figures 1 and 2 illustrated the time
courses of P and Q, respectively, plotted through each 20-
choice block for the four groups. As expected, the Condi-
tion in the second phase did not have a significant effect
on either P  [F(1,145) = 0.04] or Q [F(1,145) = 0.62],
ensuring that our experimental groups did not differ
already in the first phase. For participants who did not
perform a secondary task, the time course and the mean
values for P  were comparable with those previously
reported for groups of similar age and education
[39,47,64,65].
Confirming our first prediction, the main effect of Block
was significant for both P [F(4, 580) = 23.84, p < .0001]
and Q [F(4, 580) = 7.46, p < .0001]. The Condition in the
first phase, however, was significant only for P [F(1, 145)
= 9.52, p = .002] while did not affect Q [F(1,145) = 0.16].
This asymmetry confirmed our second prediction, and
implies that processes underlying payoff preference are
more dependent on central resources than those underly-
ing frequency preference. This is indicated by the clear
separation between the two Dual (in black) and the two
Table 1: Performance in the secondary task.
Phase
First Second
Lag 2 s 0.86 ± 0.08 0.93 ± 0.05
3 s 0.95 ± 0.03 0.96 ± 0.05
Mean accuracy (± SD) for the Secondary Task, divided by Phase and 
Lag duration.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:1 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/1
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IGT groups (in white) in the left panel of Figure 1, in con-
trast to their comparable trajectories in the left panel of
Figure 2. A predictable interaction was found between
Block and the Condition in the first phase in the case of P;
participants in the Dual condition exhibited a slower
learning curve [F(4, 580) = 3.02, p = .02]. No other inter-
action among factors was significant for either P (F < 1.19)
or Q (F < 1.81).
Testing our third prediction requires a comparison
between the two phases. Since they have different lengths,
participants' performance in the last block of the first
phase was used as proxy for the entire phase (as in [39]).
A graphic illustration of these comparisons for P and Q is
provided in the two right panels of Figures 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Two separate ANOVAs were run using Phase (2 val-
ues, First vs. Second), Condition in the first phase, and
Condition in the second phase as factors, and either P or
Q as dependent variables. As in the previous analysis, the
Condition in the first phase had a significant impact on P
[F(1, 145) = 8.06, p. = .005], but not on Q [F(1, 145) =
0.11]. However, the effect of Condition in the second
phase was not significant for either measure [P: F(1, 145)
= 1.66; Q: F(1, 145) = 0.01]. Neither the main effect of
Phase nor any of the interactions were significant (P: F <
2.75; Q: F < 2.06). Therefore, performance is determined
by the condition under which the first phase, but not the
second, is run. These results confirm that the involvement
of central cognitive resources is limited to learning and
estimating the decks' payoffs; and that, when deciding
which deck to select, participants rely on knowledge that
is easily accessible and cannot be interfered with once it
has been acquired.
The last two predictions concern the behavioral effects of
a monetary loss. To test them, all the participants' choices
in the first phase were divided in two categories: those fol-
lowing a selection that yielded a loss, and those following
a selection that produced a win (choices in the second
phase were excluded since wins and losses were kept hid-
den.) The mean values of P and Q were computed for each
participant in each category. Two ANOVAs were then run
using the Condition in the first phase (2 values, Dual vs.
IGT) and the experience of a loss in the Previous selection
(2 values: Loss vs. No Loss) as factors, and P and Q as the
dependent measures. As expected, P  was significantly
The P index across the two phases Figure 1
The P index across the two phases. Time course of the P index (tracking the preference for decks with high payoff) for the 
four groups during the experiment. Left: values of P during the five blocks of the first phase, grouped by Condition in the first 
and in the second phase. Right: A comparison of P at the end of the first phase and during the second phase, where no feed-
back was allowed. Points represent mean values ± SEM.
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affected by the Condition [F(1, 147) = 8.67, p = .004],
with participants in the Dual condition (P = -1.70, SD =
36.64) scoring lower than those in the IGT condition (P =
13.29, SD = 33.53), but was not affected by a Previous loss
[F(1, 147) = 1.21: see Figure 3, left]. On the contrary, Q
was not affected by the Condition [F(1, 147) = 0.04], but
was significantly affected by a Previous loss (F(1, 147) =
16.80, p < .0001): as predicted, participants' tendency to
select from the low-frequency decks was higher after a win
(Q = 29.80, SD = 30.68) than after a loss (Q = 14.18, SD
= 37.78: See Figure 3, right). Confirming our fifth predic-
tion, the two factors interacted significantly for Q [F(1,
147) = 3.96, p = .05], but not for P [F(1, 147) = 0.03].
As can be seen in the right panel of Figure 3, the effect of
a monetary loss on Q was larger for those participants
who did not perform the interfering task. This result is
apparently counterintuitive, but can be explained by
assuming that, after a large loss (as those produced by B or
D), participants would immediately refrain from the deck
just selected. When payoff information is not available,
participants can distribute their choices over the remain-
ing three decks. When information on the payoff structure
is available, however, participants might redistribute their
preferences among those decks with a similar perceived
payoff, i.e. prefer C after a loss caused by D, and A after a
loss caused by D. This does not alter the global payoff
preference, but selectively harms those decks (B and D)
that were previously preferred on the basis of loss fre-
quency. Therefore, when payoff information is available,
the effect of a loss on Q is stronger.
Conclusion
Our experiment showed that performance on the IGT
depends on the interaction between two separable cogni-
tive components. Although we did not collect individual
covariate measures of specific cognitive abilities, our
experimental design permits a preliminary characteriza-
tion of these two components. The first of these includes
those higher-level processes involved in tracking and dis-
covering the long-term payoff structure of the task. The
second is based on the immediate emotional reactions to
wins and losses, and is responsible for participants' sensi-
tivity to loss frequencies and reactions to loss magnitude.
These two components can be tracked by aggregating par-
ticipants' choices according to the decks' payoff or loss fre-
The Q index across the two phases Figure 2
The Q index across the two phases. Time course of the Q index (tracking the preference for decks with low frequency of 
losses) for the four groups during the experiment. Left: values of Q during the five blocks of the first phase. Right: A compar-
ison of Q at the end of the first phase and during the second phase, where no feedback was allowed. Points represent mean val-
ues ± SEM.
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quency, respectively. In fact, our results show a double
dissociation between these two processes. The first, but
not the second, is harmed by the additional demands of
an interfering task; and the second, but not the first, is
affected by the recent experience of a monetary loss.
Additionally, our design allowed us to separate the decision
stage, where participants evaluate their options and per-
form a selection, from the learning stage, where partici-
pants have the opportunity to learn about each deck's
returns. This was achieved by having participants perform
the IGT in two phases. Feedback was suspended on the sec-
ond phase, so that further learning was prevented. Our
results show that an interfering task disrupts performance
only in the first phase, but not in the second. This shows
that the learning stage, during which each decks' wins and
losses are estimated, critically requires central cognitive
resources. By contrast, the decision phase itself, whether
driven by payoff or loss frequency, can be carried out effi-
ciently in spite of an interfering task. As far as we know, this
is the first successful attempt to separate these two stages.
Other authors have previously attempted to decompose
the IGT into component processes (e.g., [11,66]). Our
framework, however, advances these attempts in two
directions. First, it accounts for a richer measurement of
performance, based on loss frequency as well as payoff.
Second, it includes a more elaborate specification of the
type of knowledge required by the two processes, includ-
ing a description of the conditions under which decision
making requires central cognitive resources.
Our conclusions are hinged on the secondary task's dis-
ruptive effect on performance, as measured by the P index.
In line with previous studies that adopted a dual-task par-
adigm to the IGT [42-45], this result was interpreted as
arising from competition for central cognitive resources,
such as working memory. One might argue that the task
we adopted is not normally used to saturate these
resources. However, as we argued in the introduction, the
IGT does not require a constant use of working memory or
other cognitive resources. Participants can use these
resources intermittently during the task, and perform long
streaks of selections building on either their previous esti-
mates or their intuition. The task we designed and used is
effective in that it consistently prevents participants from
reverting back to the IGT for the amount of time needed
to perform satisfactory payoff estimation.
Dissociation between P and Q Figure 3
Dissociation between P and Q. Left: Effects of Condition in the first phase and presence of a loss in the previous selection 
on P. Only the Condition has a significant effect on P. Right: Effects of Condition in the first phase and Presence of a Loss in 
the previous selection on Q. This time, only the Loss in the previous phase has a significant effect. Points represent mean values 
± SEM.
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An alternative explanation for our findings could be that
the time constraints posed by the secondary task have
changed participants' attitude towards risky options. In
particular, time constraints might make them less averse
to risk and more prone to select from the bad decks. In
fact, a recent study has shown that brain responses that
correlate with decision risk are slower and can be tempo-
rally dissociated [9] from those that correlate with
processing a decision outcome [7]. If risk processing
indeed takes more time, it is also more easily affected by
the distractions posed by a fast-paced interfering task. Fur-
thermore, this account could explain both our results and
those obtained in [47], where decreased IGT performance
was obtained by reducing the available decision time with
no interfering task.
One problem with this alternative interpretation arises
when we define risk. In the economic literature
(e.g.,[67,68]) as well as in neuroimaging studies of deci-
sion making [7,9], risk is operationalized as the variance
of returns within an option. In turn, variance is at maxi-
mum when the frequency of losses is higher. It follows
that the high loss-frequency decks, B and D, should be
perceived as riskier, and that any attitude change towards
risk should impact the Q, and not the P, index. On the
contrary, our data show that the secondary task affected P,
but had no effect on Q.
Another problem with the risk-aversion hypothesis is that
effect of risk aversion should be observed during the deci-
sion stage, when participants ultimately decided which
deck to pick. However, our design allowed us to separate
the decision stage from the learning stage within the IGT,
and infer that the effects of a secondary task are limited to
the learning stage. This conclusion was based on the fact
that the secondary task did not alter performance in the
second, blind phase – after learning has occurred. Had the
secondary task altered participants' attitude towards risk,
performance in the second phase should have been
affected as well. Therefore, we conclude that our account
is preferable to the risk-aversion interpretation of our
results.
The findings reported in this paper can also contribute to
interpret a number of results in the IGT literature. Impor-
tantly, they are relevant to the debate over the existence of
unconscious components of decision making in the IGT.
In our dual-process framework, implicit and explicit com-
ponents co-exist, and jointly contribute to the behavioral
choices. Identifying one or the other depends on how per-
formance data is examined. For instance, selecting from
the advantageous decks requires a demanding evaluation
of each decks' payoff that can occur only under conscious
control. It is therefore predictable that performance, when
measured only by payoff, correlates with participants'
conscious knowledge of the task [19,37]. On the other
hand, the low-level process that responds to loss fre-
quency and magnitude does not show up in this sort of
measurement. In our results, we detected it in the Q index.
It was possibly underlying participants' biases and perse-
verations in [39]. An interesting possibility is that antici-
patory physiological reactions, such as skin conductance
responses, can reflect the contribution of this low-level
process to some extent. The relative independence of this
process from payoff preferences could explain how physi-
ological responses were found in anticipation of disad-
vantageous choices in the original version of the task
[11,35], but in anticipation of advantageous choices
under a different distribution of losses [69].
Even more importantly, our results might be useful for
better understanding the source of impairment in clinical
populations performing in the IGT. Our framework sug-
gests that there are at least three potential sources for
patients' abnormal behavior.
A first source of impairment is the inability to allocate suf-
ficient cognitive resources to the IGT. This prevents
patients from conducting a sufficiently accurate assess-
ment of the decks, and, therefore, leads to detectable per-
formance differences in terms of payoff measures (e.g., the
P index) when compared with controls. This is the case,
for instance, of patients with working memory impair-
ment due to prefrontal lesions [15]. Although similar
impairments are not affective in nature, they can possibly
originate from an emotional disorder. In depression, for
instance, mental rumination hinders executive functions
and problem solving abilities [70,71], and can thus inter-
fere with patients' efforts to examine the payoff structure
of the task.
A second source of impairment is in the emotional reac-
tions to losses. Our results show that experienced mone-
tary losses trigger a temporary shift in decision
preferences. In patients with affective disorders, this
change might not take place at all (e.g., [2]), or might
occur and have longer behavioral effects. Because of the
structure of the IGT, this kind of impairment affects per-
formance measured by the Q index, but does not necessar-
ily impact the traditional payoff-based performance
scores. Regrettably, however, most patient studies have
assessed IGT performance only in terms of payoff, and
might have overlooked important significant differences
in this measure.
Our framework allows for a third, potential source of
impairment. It states that participants have two types of
knowledge, one deriving from careful payoff estimation
and one from emotional reaction to losses or wins. Not
only these two types of information, but also their relativeBehavioral and Brain Functions 2009, 5:1 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/1
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utilities need to be learned – and ultimately learned from
feedback on one's own actions. Therefore, we propose
that affective reactions play a double role in decision mak-
ing, and that they are used not only to evaluate decision
options, but also for guiding meta-decisions on how to
select among alternative decision policies.
Converging lines of evidence indicate that, for example,
VMPFC patients' impairments could originate at this level.
For instance, these patients poorly organize their search of
information about decision options. In the IGT, they per-
sist in selecting from the disadvantageous decks even
when they are aware that the other options have higher
returns [11]. Finally, this explanation is consistent with
their inability to re-learn deck-outcome associations [33].
In fact, we suggest that decision-making impairments in
patients with affective disorders often originate at this
meta-strategic level. As such, they do not betray a mal-
function in an isolated emotional decision making sys-
tem, but problems in exploiting emotions to consolidate
decision policies and organize behavior.
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